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    In 1965 George Grant created a national debate when he published his classic text, 
Lament for a Nation. The central thesis of this book was captured in its subtitle, "The 
Defeat of Canadian Nationalism." While Grant sees the defeat of Diefenbaker's 
government in 1963 as emblematic of the inability of Canadians to sustain their 
independence from the United States, he argues that the causes of this defeat lay deeper 
than any particular political event. For Grant, the sources of Canada's demise lay in the 
philosophical and political spirit of modernity and in the technological domination it 
asserts. He saw in Canadian Nationalism the noble belief that a more stable, conservative 
society could exist on the borders of the United States, the nation which, on his view, 
more than any other embodied this technological modernity. In 1963, Grant argued, the 
folly, the impossibility of this belief had finally exposed itself. 
    In April 1965 James Doull, George Grant's friend and former colleague, wrote to him 
about the newly published work: "Your book is as exasperating as it is brilliant. The 
worst is that you, incapable as any could be of inaction and mere lament, encourage 
Canadians to give up the battle before it has been fought."1 Three years later Doull wrote 
again to Grant, now expressing how some of their difference over Canada had affected 
their friendship: "Sometimes I have spoken or written harshly about your attachment to 
Upper Canadian conservatism, not evidently without giving offence I had not intended. 
What moved my comments was that you know young Canadians, can speak to them as no 
other: that this being so, you did not speak a little more hopefully to them - did not 
prepare them to resist a little more strongly absorption into the American Empire. For my 
part, I can only act as though resistance makes some sense."2 Doull would continue to 
engage Grant's Lament for a Nation, throughout his political writings and reflections on 
Canada, for example, in Naturalistic Individualism: Quebec Independence and an 
                                                
1 Letter on file with the Doull Archive, Sir Wilfred Grenfell College, Memorial University of 
Newfoundland. 
2 Letter on file with the Doull Archive, Sir Wilfred Grenfell College 
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Independent Canada, published in a festschrift for Grant (1983) and in his most important 
political writing "The Philosophical Basis of Constitutional Discussion in Canada" 
(1997).  
    While Grant and Doull articulate their reactions to the Canada of the second-half of the 
twentieth-century in the contrasting emotional terms of lamentation and hope, these 
reactions should not be understood to be simply subjective or personal. This 
disagreement between Doull and Grant is of more than merely biographical interest, it 
reflects more than a dispute between friends. In both cases the personal responses reflect 
deeply considered philosophical principles. For both Grant and Doull, the right 
understanding of Canada's historical lot must be placed within a deeper reflection of what 
history is and whether through it there is accomplished a relation between the human and 
the divine. Both Grant and Doull were uncommon among political philosophers in that 
they wrote not in the context of concepts borrowed from the social sciences (economics, 
sociology, psychology, historiography) but within the expanded horizon of the long 
history of western philosophy and culture, from the Ancient world to their own twentieth 
century.3 At home in the world of Plato and that of Rawls alike, they represent peculiarly 
complex accounts of their own contemporaneity animated by an extraordinary historical 
resonance and perspective. An investigation of their conflict then involves quite 
instructive questions about the history of western philosophy and represents a significant 
moment in Canada's own philosophical history. This essay hopes to serve as an 
introduction to their conflict through an analysis of some of its essential components. The 
leading question is why Grant believed Canada impossible and Doull believed in the 
possibility of Canada. To address this question we first consider key differences in their 
philosophies of history (and histories of philosophy), then we address their varying 
conceptions of technology (a central concept in each of their views) and finally by this 
circuitous route we arrive at a consideration of their diverse approaches to Canadian 
sovereignty. 
 
History, Necessity And Philosophy 
    Grant tells us that the context of his lament for the demise of Canadian nationhood 
rested in an understanding of history fundamentally opposed to the liberal conception of 
history as the development of freedom and equality. Grant, by the time he wrote Lament 
for a Nation, had broken with the doctrine of progress in which he had been raised and to 
which in his first book, Philosophy in the Mass Age(1959) he subscribed, in what he 
believed was the form articulated by Hegel. In 1966 - the year after Lament for a Nation 
was published, Grant described his earlier attachment to Hegel's account: "At the 
theoretical level, I considered Hegel the greatest of all philosophers. He had partaken of 
all that was true and beautiful and good in the Greek world and was able to synthesize it 
with Christianity and with the freedom of the Enlightenment and modern science. It 
                                                
3 M. Darrol Bryant, makes this point re. Grant in his, "The Barren Twilight: History and Faith in Grant's 
Lament" in George Grant in Process, ed. Larry Schmidt, (Toronto: Anansi Press, 1978) 110. 
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cannot be insisted too often how hard it is for anyone who believes the western Christian 
doctrine of providence to avoid reaching the conclusion that Hegel has understood the 
implications of that doctrine better than any other thinker. I therefore attempted to write 
down in non-professional language the substance of the vision that the age of reason was 
beginning to dawn and first in North America."4 By the early 1960s, due both to reading 
figures such as Leo Strauss, Jacques Ellul and Simone Weil and his experience of the 
deepening modernization of Canada, Grant came to reject Hegel's "claim to have taken 
the truth of antique thought and synthesized it with the modern to produce a higher (and 
perhaps highest) truth."5  
    In the concluding chapter of Lament for a Nation, Grant turned explicitly against what 
he found most disturbing in the Hegelian doctrine of progress, namely the claim that "Die 
Weltgeschichte ist da Weltgericht". Here Grant argued that "the doctrines of progress and 
providence have been brought together."6 Historical development was both development 
toward higher forms of human life and at the same time made God's will scrutable as 
being accomplished in these higher forms. This doctrine of progress was connected to 
Grant's account of Canada because he saw in its hold upon Canadians a source of their 
blindness to what was being lost in the passing away of what was specifically Canadian 
through ever greater integration with the United States and its dynamic modernity. In this 
doctrine, Canadians could see this integration not as loss, but rather, as part of the 
beneficent, liberating movement of history, a stage in the fuller realization of freedom. In 
portraying the future as a necessarily higher stage than the past, the doctrine of progress, 
in Grant's eyes, reconfigures evil, loss, destruction and the whole suffering of historical 
life, as good, as redeemed through its role in the higher achievement of future 
development: "But if history is the final court of appeal, force is the final argument. Is it 
possible to look at history and deny that within its dimension force is the supreme ruler? 
To take a progressive view of providence is to come close to worshiping force. Does this 
not make us cavalier about evil? The screams of the tortured child can be justified by the 
achievements of history. How pleasant for the achievers, but how meaningless for the 
child. As a believer, I must then reject these Western interpretations of providence. Belief 
is blasphemy if it rests on any easy identification of necessity and good."7  
    Grant saw in the doctrine of progress, and most fully in the Hegelian expression of it, a 
confusion between what he referred to as the order of necessity and the order of the good. 
Grant argued that Plato, and the ancients generally, preserved a distinction between the 
eternal or the Good and necessity, a realm of becoming which participates in the eternal, 
but remains as other to it. It was only by so distinguishing the historical and the eternal 
that the distinction of good and evil could be retained. Grant found the same distinction in 
Christianity that he found in Platonism in the notion that for Christianity God's will, 
Providence, is not scrutable and so we are called not to look to human history but to 
Christ, and most fully, his crucifixion, for our theology. Using Luther's terms, Grant 
                                                
4 George Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age (Toronto: Coop Clark, 1959, 1966) vii. 
5 Grant, Mass Age, viii. 
6 George Grant, Lament For a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism, (Ottawa: Carleton University 
Press, 1997) 99. 
7 Grant, Lament, 100. 
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distinguished a theology of glory - above all embodied in the doctrine of progress - from 
a theology of the cross. In the one, Grant saw a triumphalism where human will or 
subjectivity was seen as an agent of divine activity in the world; in the other, he saw a 
deep humiliation of Christ not asserting his will, but rather giving it away both to his 
Father and, in forgiveness and love, to those who had persecuted him. For Grant, Christ's 
greatness lay in his giving his will away toward the eternal order and, even in the face of 
extreme affliction, in the very abandonment of God, not conforming to the willfulness of 
the realm of necessity and historical life.  
    Grant saw in the Hegelian uniting of progress and providence a radical reduction of all 
otherness to human historical life, ultimately to human subjectivity and will. Grant saw 
otherness - both the otherness of God and of other beings - as preservable only in the 
recognition of an order of the good, an order of justice, that precedes human willing and 
activity. Grant here saw two levels of recognition: 1) a Platonic recognition that affirmed 
justice as the love of the beautiful in otherness and so the limitation of one's will through 
virtue made possible by the illumination of one's intelligence by the Good; 2) the still 
more radical Christian form of love of otherness in the giving away of one's self for the 
sake of otherness in the face of radical affliction or the experience of the absence of the 
Good. In spite of these distinctions between what Grant took to be the platonic and 
Christian accounts of the Good what they together affirmed was a relation of the human 
to the good as receptive or participatory and not as generative or determining. For Grant, 
religion, art and philosophy are all forms of participation and so, in a broader sense they 
are all religious. There is certainly a human activity in each, but only as responsive to and 
within a "gift" from the eternal source. It is only this standpoint of receptivity or 
openness, as Strauss and a number of other contemporary thinkers also suggest, that 
makes possible an apprehension of the eternal as eternal and not simply a moment of 
human self-activity.  
    Doull, by contrast with Grant, defends the Hegelian account of history as not only 
compatible with the Christian religion, but as inherent in it. Doull agrees with Grant that 
religion has within it a passivity, a received character. Doull, following Hegel, argues that 
religion is to be understood primarily under the concept of representation or image, what 
Hegel called Vorstellung. Hegel conceives religion as: "[T]he consciousness of absolute 
truth in the way that it occurs for all human beings."8 While the inward feeling of this 
union with God is the subjective component - what Hegel calls certainty - the content of 
the feeling is its objective side - and this for Hegel is representation.9 This inward 
certainty of a given content does not for Doull any more than for Grant represent a 
demonstration of the truth but rather an immediate experience of God. Where Doull and 
Grant will part ways, however, is in their conceptions of the relationship between the 
rationality of the finite thinker and his intuition of God. Doull, by contrast with Grant, 
will insist that revelation in its religious form is not authoritative for philosophy. He will 
contend that the experience especially of the Christian representation calls forth in the 
human subject a free rationality comprehensive of its intuited content. But it is as Idea 
                                                
8 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, (Trs.) Brown, Hodgson, and Stewart (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1988) 144. 
9 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, 144. 
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and not as representation that the truth of the Christian religion, for Doull, is most 
adequately articulated or revealed. Philosophy, on this Hegelian account, is 
comprehensive of religion through a twofold transformation of representations into 
concepts. On the one hand, thought brings to representation the category of necessity, 
while on the other, thought, beyond the immediacy of representation, exhibits the 
mediation and contradiction involved in simple images.10  
    However, it is important to recognize that this transformation of religion, and 
specifically the Christian religion, at the hands of philosophy is, according to Doull, 
neither simply religion's dissolution into philosophy nor an external imposition. In a 
number of articles Doull defended Hegel's claim that philosophy could comprehend 
religion and specifically the Christian religion in thought and yet in doing so preserve it 
in its distinctness as religion. According to Doull, the Hegelian standpoint is, in one 
sense, beyond religion, but as well also secularity: "The ladder to the philosophical 
science seems unscalable to Christian and atheist alike. It is indeed unscalable to whoever 
adheres to any form of experience as ultimately authoritative."11 But this "dissolution" of 
experience that Hegel accomplishes in the Phenomenology of Spirit is only a stage 
necessary to establish the beginning point of philosophy. As Doull puts it: "It does not 
fall within the argument of the Phenomenology to show how religion and philosophy are 
related to each other in the Hegelian philosophy."12 While, for Hegel, philosophy as the 
highest and most complete form of spirit is comprehensive of religion, this by no means 
entails that religion (and art) is not to remain an autonomous expression of spirit. Rather, 
according to Doull's reading of Hegel: "Philosophy of religion has for its purpose, not to 
replace religion, but to save it from confusion with other forms of spirit."13 Furthermore, 
Doull argues that an intellectus fidei is an inner demand of the Christian revelation itself: 
that it is inherent to that revelation that it "be for thought, as well as for the Vorstellung of 
the apostolic faith."14 The Hegelian philosophy of religion arises from this demand and as 
such belongs to the whole history of Christian theology.  
    Hegel's philosophy of religion everywhere informs Doull's own account, which 
contrasts so strongly with Grant's, of the relation of Christianity to historical existence. It 
is useful, therefore, briefly to consider some of the detail of Hegel's account of the 
Christian Vorstellung. Hegel contends that it belongs to the inner content of the Christian 
revelation that the rational believer knows what is revealed in scripture not only in the 
abstraction of an otherworldly ideal (whether mythologically or metaphysically 
expressed) but also concretely as active in human history. Indeed on the Hegelian view, 
the term "representation" refers not only to the realm of religious analogy, simile and 
image but also to history itself. Hegel's consideration of the historical Jesus is instructive 
here. He states: "This story does not merely count as a myth in the mode of images. 
Instead it involves sensible occurrences - the nativity, passion and death of Christ as 
                                                
10 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, 154. 
11 Doull, "Would Hegel Today be a Hegelian?", Dialogue 228. 
12 Doull, "Comment on Quentin Lauer" in D. E. Christian, ed., Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion (The 
Hague: Martinus Nighott, 1970) 279. 
13 Doull, "Comment on Lauer", 278. 
14 Doull, "The Chritian Origin of Contemporary Institutions Part II" Dionysius VIII (1984) 79. 
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something completely historical. Of course it therefore exists for representation and in the 
mode of representation, but it also has another intrinsic aspect. The story of Jesus is 
something twofold, a divine history. Not only is there this outward history, which should 
only be taken as the ordinary story of a human being, but it also has the divine as its 
content: a divine happening, a divine deed, an absolutely divine action. This absolute 
divine action is the inward - the genuine, the substantive dimension of this history."15 
Thus for Hegel scripture, by virtue of its historical dimension, is beyond the 
indeterminacy of myth; the divine Idea is the substance equally of scriptural 
representation and of the historical dimension of revelation. 
    But, for Hegel, to conceive the 'revelation' of the Divine Idea as belonging to the 
historical life of Jesus alone and not as the substance of human history itself, is to confine 
oneself to the immediate and hence representative consciousness characteristic of the 
limited perspective of the first Christians. To speak in religious terms, to hold in a 
hardened way to the empirical side of revelation's Vorstellung is radically to historicize 
the Incarnation, consigning the revelation to the externality of the life Jesus. The result of 
such an externalizing of revelation is to treat Jesus's death as simply the loss of the unity 
between God and humanity and thus to make the Holy Spirit into a ghost. This approach 
conceives Jesus at best as an image for humans: like Socrates a great teacher, like 
Mohammed a messenger, like Isaiah a prophet. There is in this consciousness a polemical 
attitude to worldly things. Loosely quoting and drawing together passages from Scripture, 
Hegel states, "Thus Christ says: 'Who is my mother, [my] sister, and [my] brother.' Or: 
'Follow me! Leave the dead to bury the dead. Go forth and proclaim the kingdom of 
God.' 'I have not come to bring peace on earth, but rather children will leave their parents 
and follow me.'"16 Hegel's interpretation of these passages is of interest: "We see here a 
polemical attitude expressed against the ethical relationships that have hitherto prevailed. 
These are all teachings and characteristics that belong to its first appearance, when the 
new religion constitutes the sole interest [of its adherents], which they were bound to 
believe they were still in danger of losing." On Hegel's account this expresses a desire for 
immediate reconciliation with the Kingdom of God. However, what is lacking in this 
impulse is a recognition of the "mediation through which this elevation [of soul] may 
come to pass for humanity."17  
    For Hegel this mediation and the full meaning of the Incarnation demands that the 
externality of the life and death of Jesus be converted into its inner spiritual truth. Beyond 
Grant's sense that the death of Christ shows the path for humans in the sacrifice of 
subjectivity and will, Hegel argues that death is not only the "stripping away of the 
human and the negative". He states: "At the same time death itself is this negative, the 
furthest extreme to which humanity as natural existence is exposed; God himself is 
[involved in] this."18 As argued above it is this radical identification of God with finite 
otherness to which Grant most vigorously objects. It is this divinization of the finite that 
                                                
15 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, 147. 
16 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, 460. 
17 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, 461. This insight informs the beginning of Doull's "The Christian Origins 
of Contemporary Institutions" Dionysius VI (1982) 111. 
18 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, 468. 
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Grant sees as the determining hubris of modernity and against which his whole 
standpoint is defined. Hegel (and Doull) would agree with Grant that any direct 
identification of human and divine is destructive of ethical and spiritual life and he is 
clear that this is a limitation of modern consciousness.19 However, Grant's view is 
nonetheless, from a Hegelian perspective, one-sided: Grant, in seeking to preserve God 
from identification with the finitude and violence of human history, simply separates God 
from history. For Hegel, by contrast, it belongs to the Christian Vorstellung that: "God 
has shown himself to be reconciled with the world, … even the human is not something 
alien to him, but rather … this otherness, this self-distinguishing, finitude as it is 
expressed, is a moment of God himself, although to be sure, it is a disappearing 
moment."20 For Hegel, then, the unity of God with finite otherness is eternal, but eternally 
disappearing as well. God is eternally beyond the negativity and evil of human finitude 
but not as from the standpoint of the understanding because he is simply separate from it, 
but because he is eternally the activity of revealing himself as the redemption of suffering 
and evil, as in principle comprehensive of all difference. The unity of God and human 
history is not then in itself absolute but rather an eternally passing moment of spirit. That 
the immediacy of the relation between God and history is in important ways transitional, 
as expressed for example, in Hegel's image of history as the "slaughterbench of nations", 
suggests that it is inadequate directly to identify his view of history with the modern 
notion of progress and further that along with the immanence of God in historical life, he 
maintains the transcendence of God beyond historical existence.21  
    For Hegel, Christianity is revelatory of God's relation to historical life: "Christians, 
then, are initiated into the mysteries of God, and this also supplies us with the key to 
world history. For we have here a definite knowledge of providence and its plan. It is one 
of the central doctrines of Christianity that providence has ruled and continues to rule the 
world, and that everything that happens in the world is determined by and commensurate 
with divine government."22 This revealed knowledge of the positive relation of God to 
human historical existence, while at first religiously received, becomes the foundation, 
according to Hegel, of a new confidence in human historical agency a confidence that 
underlies modern secularity. It is the appearance of modern secularity and the need to 
relate it to the Christian Vorstellung, that according to both Hegel and Doull, is what 
generates a philosophy of religion freed of the form of Vorstellung, but in agreement with 
its content. As Doull puts it: "This [Hegelian] philosophy gives adequate form to what is 
believed in the Christian religion and is the true intellectus fidei; a thinking neither 
extraneous to its content nor mediated only through the subject, as in the Augustinianism 
become modern philosophy."23 Or as Hegel says of the simply religious representation of 
God's relation to historical life: "Religion does not go beyond this general representation; 
                                                
19 See Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, (Tr) T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) sections 139-140, 
for a consideration of the limits of too immediate an identification of the human will and the absolute good. 
20 Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, 469. 
21 This standpoint forms the background of Doull's position in his debate with Emil Fackenheim in "Would 
Hegel Today be a Hegelian". 
22 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World HistoryIntroduction: Reason in History, (Tr) H.B. Nisbett, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 41. 
23 Doull, "Hegel's Phenomenology and Postmodern Thought." Animus 5, (2000) 
<http://www.swgc.mun.ca/animus/2000vol5/doull5a.htm> 
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it remains on the level of generality. But we must proceed from this general faith firstly 
to philosophy and then to the philosophy of world history."24  
    Doull argues on the basis of Hegel's philosophy of religion that Grant's account of the 
separation of God and history, or necessity, is neither true nor Christian. On Hegel's 
account it belongs to the full philosophical articulation of the Christian Vorstellung that 
the human relation to God is mediated by the activity of the thinking subject and by the 
development of history. The contemplation of God, from an initial withdrawal from the 
world in early Christianity, is inwardly transformed so as to bring forth a recognition of 
the logos present in human activity, both in its contemplative and practical dimensions. 
History is not conceived then as a merely external necessity or Fate but as the activity of 
an infinite actuality, a necessity that has as its telos the Good conceived as self-conscious 
freedom, what Hegel calls spirit. It belongs to the Hegelian philosophy to know that the 
Trinitarian God revealed in Christianity is at the same time the ground of historical, 
worldly existence. Doull makes this point relative to the Hegelian position: "The 
movement of this thought, as in the Vorstellung, is to a relation of equal 'persons' within 
which are contained all subjective and objective concepts. On this foundation rests a 
Sittlichkeit in which 'life' or the immediate existence of spirit, and its relation of 
individuals in their particularity, are comprehended in a self-governing community 
wherein the unity of freedom and nature in family, society and state is equally the 
unfolding of an objective end, and, from the side of individuals, the realizing of that end 
is their concrete good."25  
    It is the state, and above all the modern state, that is, according to both Doull and 
Hegel, the focus of God's relation to historical life and is, as such, the precise object of 
world history in general and so also the substance of Hegel's theodicy.26 In the Philosophy 
of Right Hegel contends: "The march of God in the world, that is what the state is. The 
basis of the state is the power of reason actualizing itself as will."27 What constitutes the 
divinity of the state for Hegel is that it is the finite completion of the spiritual life of 
individuals, the fullest expression of their practical freedom: "The state is the actuality of 
concrete freedom. But concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and 
its particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain explicit 
recognition for their right (as they do in the sphere of the family and civil society) but for 
one thing they pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and for 
another they know and will the universal; they even recognize it as their own substantive 
mind; they take it as their end and are active in its pursuit." And further: "The principle of 
the modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of 
subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal 
particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so 
                                                
24 Hegel, Reason in History, 41. 
25 Doull, "Postmodern Thought", 6. 
26 Hegel, Reason in History, 43 and 97. 
27 It is important to see that, contrary to persistent caricature, Hegel does not identify the Idea of the state 
with any particular state: "In considering the Idea of the state we must not have our eyes on particular states 
or on particular institutions. Instead we must consider the Idea, this actual God by itself"(Philosophy of 
Right, 258-A). 
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maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself."28 Doull argues, from this 
Hegelian account, that the state in its full development surpasses and comprehends 
modern freedom so that this freedom is not corrupting of pre-modern virtue, but is rather 
the fulfilling of the promise of the ancient world: "In Plato's polities the ruling power was 
freed from the special interests of classes. The difficulty then occurred how the ruling 
part could be in the state. How this uncorrupted independence of the ruler could move 
effectively the classes to the realization of the good is shown in Hegel's concept of the 
state."29  
    But this is just what George Grant denies. Fundamental to Grant's denial of the 
Hegelian account of history is his claim that modernity is fundamentally corruptive of 
virtue and the human participation in Justice and thus rather than fulfilling the platonic 
philosophy is its ruination. For Grant, the synthesis of ancient and modern, of Christian 
and secular that Hegel took himself to have effected is seen to be impossible. The ancient 
account that preserves the distinction between the necessary and the good cannot, with 
integrity, be united with an account that dissolves this distinction. In the doctrine of 
progress and its turn to human historical activity, Grant sees not a realization of the 
divine, but rather an obscuring of the divine and of genuine otherness - their reduction to 
moments of the will. For Grant otherness is preserved as otherness by being seen as 
grounded in the Good as its source and so as having a being apart from human willing. 
The destruction of otherness, however much it belongs to the order of necessity to bring 
this about, is therefore secured as irreducibly evil. In the doctrine of progress both the 
realm of natural and human otherness and divine otherness or the order of the Good, are 
drawn into human will and subjectivity and so obscured. From this perspective Hegel's 
understanding of history must be seen, if not in intention, at least in result, to involve the 
dissolution not only of religion, but of every relation, philosophic, artistic, civic or moral, 
of the human to an order transcending and defining the human Grant sees built into the 
modern conception of the state, not as Doull and Hegel would have it a fulfilling of the 
ancient, but its dissolution. 
    Grant agrees with Leo Strauss that the articulation of that modern break occurs through 
a set of stages or "waves" beginning with Machiavelli and Hobbes who reduce the order 
of justice to a set of natural rights based on given human needs - no longer purposes 
given to humanity. 30The next wave is that expounded by Rousseau, Hegel and Marx 
which finds justice or right as having no basis even in the givenness of natural need, but 
is the result of historical development. It is this stage of modernity that gives rise to the 
doctrine of progress. However, this wave is replaced by the still more radical modernity 
of Nietzsche and Heidegger, that grounds justice and right in the pure becoming of a 
historicity understood as without rational ground - beyond good and evil and beyond 
providence. In this account, which Grant borrows from Strauss, the modern state is 
revealed to be more and more an instrument of a nihilistic, secular will that has lost all 
contact with an eternal order of Justice and the Good. For Grant, this account of modern 
                                                
28 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 260. 
29 Doull, "Hegel's Critique of Hellenic Virtue" Dionysius IX (1985) 14. 
30 According to Grant, in contrast to Strauss, the origins of modernity do not lie in modernity but in 
medieval and ultimately Augustinian Christianity and the primacy of will and personality found there. 
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political thought describes much of what is at work in modernity and the kind of 
obscuring of the eternal effected at a political and moral level; but what interests Grant is 
not so much this articulation of nihilistic willing in the thought of the great modern 
political philosophers, but a more deep seated historical shaping - symbiotically related to 
the development of modern political thought - which Grant describes as "technology." 
    From Grant's perspective it is the coming to be of "technology" in the modern world 
that most powerfully undermines both the Hegelian account of history that Doull upholds 
and the confidence of Doull and other Canadians that Canada has an independent 
sovereignty. Grant's argument that the orders of good and necessity are separate, that 
God's providence is and must be inscrutable, rests on his effort to establish a standpoint 
free of the technological. Grant's claim that Canada is no longer sustainable rests on the 
understanding of technology as inherently destructive of particular societies and 
especially those sustained by a pre-modern understanding. Canada cannot both sustain its 
independence and participate in modern technology. Equally, Doull's claim that the 
Hegelian account of history is true and that Canada can, even while embracing modern 
technology, retain its independence, requires both that the Hegelian account of history be 
capable of comprehending the "technological" and that Canada be capable of sustaining 
itself in the context of modern technology. How technology is understood by Grant and 
Doull respectively is fundamental for seeing the connections between their accounts of 
the fate of Canada and their differing conceptions of how God relates to historical life, 
especially in and through the state. Whether 'technology' is destructive of the state as an 
ethical community or comprehensible within the state is the central question dividing 
Grant and Doull over the possibility of Canada.  
 
The Question Concerning Technology  
    According to both Grant and Doull, the fundamental question of the contemporary is 
posed by the presence of technology. And according to both thinkers technology is not to 
be understood as simply the devices before us, nor the science that gave rise to those 
devices, nor even the various developments in moral, political and religious thought that 
made possible the coming to be of those sciences. Deeper than these levels is the 
characterization of technology as a mode of being, what Heidegger characterizes as an 
ontology. Doull and Grant agree that the standpoint of technology involves a break with 
the European tradition of contemplation and rise to the eternal. In technology is the 
assertion of a radical, this worldly mastering of nature and humanity that is essentially 
atheistic and destructive of the givenness of all traditional forms. 
    What principally distinguishes Doull's accounts from Grant's is that Grant takes 
technology so understood as a complete or comprehensive ontology, while Doull, though 
acknowledging the profound contemporary experience of technology as ontological, 
would question this status. That is, Doull fully accepts that the contemporary world 
encounters technology as the underlying standpoint that shapes all encounters with the 
world, that is, as an ontology. However, Doull also asserts that a deeper and historically 
informed analysis reveals this experience as, in fact, historically constructed or mediated. 
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What we contemporaries experience as an all-pervasive immediate ontology, is, in truth, 
a mediated relation. In short, Doull does not so much reject Grant's account of technology 
and its fundamental role in shaping the contemporary, as seek to place it in a larger 
context that frees our understanding of the contemporary of the apparent fatality of 
technology that Grant perceives. On Grant's view, Doull's claims fail adequately to grasp 
the inner nature of technology and assert an Hegelian standpoint that makes the 
impossible claim to mediate technological ontology and the ontology of ancient and 
Christian accounts. However, to assess the relative merits of Grant and Doull's claims it 
is necessary to consider in more detail their respective ennucleations of technology. 
    The experience of the society he lived in as "technological" was fundamental to Grant's 
thinking throughout his life. The titles of a number of his writings bear simple testimony 
to this fact. For the purposes of this brief exploration of Grant's account of technology it 
is useful to divide the development of his thinking, after his break with Hegel in the early 
1960s, into two stages. The first stage comprises most of the 1960s when his thinking 
about technology was principally guided by Jacques Ellul and Leo Strauss. The second 
stage began with his encounter with the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger. It should be 
said that underlying these developments there was a common structure to his thinking 
about technology and one that relates him to a set of contemporary thinkers. Like 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Strauss, but also figures such as Karl Lowith, Etienne Gilson, 
and Alisdair MacIntyre, Grant argues that technological modernity is nihilistic, and that 
this nihilism reveals a suppressed, forgotten or overlooked principle that we can now 
recover through a return to an older tradition or standpoint refused by modernity, but 
nonetheless presupposed by it. For Heidegger or Nietzsche this return was to the pre-
Socratics: for Lowith, it was to the Stoics, for Strauss, to Plato and for Gilson and 
MacIntyre, to Aquinas. In Grant's case the return is to a Christian Platonism, especially as 
expounded in the writings of Simone Weil. This basic structure - the nihilism of 
technology and the corresponding return to a hidden Christian-Platonic standpoint - 
remains constant in Grant, once he broke with the thought of Hegel. What develops in his 
thinking is a deepening of the two sides: a deepening that involves a growing clarity 
about the irreconcilability of technology with Christian-platonism.  
    Grant began his account of this division through the work of Ellul and Strauss. What 
they taught Grant, was to see the contemporary world, especially North America, as 
fundamentally given over to a civilizational order incompatible with ancient or Christian 
accounts of virtue or piety. Grant has learned from Strauss that built into all forms of 
modernity is a certain dynamic leading to the "universal and homogeneous state." Grant 
agreed with Strauss that the universal and homogeneous state, that both liberalism and 
Marxism pursued, would result not in a liberated humanity released from all former limits 
and structures of oppression, but in a total tyranny inherently obstructive of all forms of 
higher life - religion, philosophy and so on. Grant, however, disagreed with Strauss's 
assertion that the most completely modern forms were to be found in the second and third 
waves - those he associated with communism and national socialism respectively. Strauss 
made fundamental the level of the political order and the ideology underlying that order. 
At that level Grant agreed that communism and national socialism represented more 
"advanced" forms of modernity. But for Grant, and here he drew on Ellul, the actual 
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dynamic of modernity, what underlay and informed its civilizational hold upon the world, 
was not at the level of political thought so much as at the level of "technology". The best 
way, in Grant's eyes, to characterize the contemporary was, in Ellul's phrase, as a 
"technological society." The principle articulated in this society is "the conquest of 
human and non-human nature."31  
    When the dynamic of modernity is understood in terms of the conquest of human and 
non-human nature, the analysis of the contemporary world is importantly reconfigured. 
According to Strauss, but also Marxist analysis, communist regimes informed by the 
more developed thinking of figures from Rousseau to Marx, are more modern than a 
regime such as the United States, informed by the earlier thought of Hobbes and Locke 
that emphasized natural rights. However, Grant, in pointing to the deeper role of 
technology, suggests that in fact American liberalism is the more modern form - not 
because it is a more advanced form politically, but because it is less developed and more 
pragmatic at the level of political thought and is thus, ironically, more permissive of the 
unconstrained unfolding of technological dynamism: "Liberalism is, then, the faith that 
can understand progress as an extension into the unlimited possibility of the future. It 
does this much better than Marxism, which still blocks progress by its old-fashioned 
ideas of the perfectibility of man."32 In liberalism the dynamic modern account of man's 
essence as freedom is allowed untrammeled development.33  
    The implication of this analysis of the role of technology as the dynamo of modernity, 
is the recognition of the United States as the centre of modernity. This is obviously going 
to be a vital point when we turn to Grant's account of the impossibility of Canada. But 
here what is worth noting is that Grant sees that the U.S. is inherently imperialistic 
precisely because of its technological character. American imperialism, however, while 
sharing many similarities with traditional European imperialism is distinctive in its 
fundamentally technological character. American imperialism is not primarily realized 
through conquest and colonial expansion, as were the older European empires, rather it is 
accomplished by the willing or coerced accession of other peoples and civilizations to the 
expansion of technological civilization. For Grant, in the 1960s, the clearest expression of 
American technological imperialism was the Vietnam War. As Grant put it, there the 
Americans were willing to commit genocide rather than allow the Vietnamese to stand 
apart from the American liberal technological empire.  
    What the reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger brought to Grant was not so much a 
revision of his earlier conception of technology, as a deepening of that conception. One 
way to refer to the account Grant held of technology while he was writing Lament for a 
Nation was that it was fundamentally a "civilizational" account. Technology was, 
centrally, a certain civilizational form given over to the mastery of human and non-
human nature. The reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger, following Lament, allowed Grant 
to see the ground of this civilization as "ontological". What makes technology so 
enveloping and fateful is that it enfolds the very fundamental ways of our thinking and 
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being: "To put the matter crudely; when we represent technology to ourselves through its 
common sense we think of ourselves as picking and choosing in a supermarket, rather 
than within the analogy of a package deal. We have bought a package deal of far more 
fundamental novelness than simply a set of instruments under our control. It is a destiny 
which enfolds us in its own conceptions of instrumentality, neutrality and purposiveness. 
It is in this sense that it has been truthfully said: technology is the ontology of the age. 
Western peoples (and perhaps soon all peoples) take themselves as subjects confronting 
otherness as objects - objects lying as raw material at the disposal of knowing and 
making subjects. Unless we comprehend the package deal we obscure from ourselves the 
central difficulty in our present destiny: we apprehend our destiny by forms of thought 
which are themselves the very core of the destiny."34  
    How this ontology of technology came to be is a real question for Grant. Precisely 
because it is nihilistic and historically specific, it can not be seen as belonging simply to 
the nature of things, but neither can it as ontological be attributed to a self-conscious 
human agency. The ontology of technology arises specifically out of the historical 
development of the West, but not as willed or consciously constructed. In this sense the 
origins of technology are inherently obscure. Certainly modernity is, for Grant, through 
and through technological. But the roots of technology lie deeper than modernity, which 
Grant argues, with Heidegger, presupposes technological ontology rather than initiates it. 
Grant points to these deeper roots in a late essay: "I do not mean by 'technology' the sum 
of all modern techniques, but that unique co-penetration of knowing and making, of the 
arts and sciences which originated in Western Europe and has now become worldwide. 
Behind such descriptions lies the fact that 'technology' is an affirmation concerning what 
is; it remains unfathomed, but is very closely interwoven with that primal affirmation 
made by medieval Westerners as they accepted their Christianity in a new set of 
apperceptions. That affirmation had something to do with a new content given by 
Western people to the activity of 'willing.' 'Technology' is the closest, yet inadequate 
word for what that new affirmation has become as it is now worked out i, n us and around 
us."35  
    What Grant learned chiefly from reading Nietzsche was that the heart of technological 
ontology was what Nietzsche characterized as the will-to-power: a will to mastery, a will 
to more free and creative willing in which all otherness or givenness is reduced to being 
but a moment of the will. As the above quotation suggests, Grant saw the roots of this 
pure willing in the Western Augustinian turn to the will. It is in reaction to this 
development of the Western tradition that Grant turns to a Christian Platonism more 
consonant - in his eyes- with the Eastern development of Christianity.36 What this non-
Western tradition preserved was a sense of the Good or God as participatively, but not 
willfully, present in the world. God and the order of creation, especially the order of 
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justice were present in the very being of the world, not through a self-active will - 
whether divine or human. All of this is clearly related to Grant's break with the Hegelian 
account of history as God's activity. 
    The centrality of the will in the West, Grant suggests, is ultimately generative of the 
standpoint of technology, of an ontology of the will to power that necessarily, as Grant 
puts it "has meant for all of us a very dimming of our ability to think justice lucidly."37 
What Nietzsche clarified, above all, for Grant was that the ontology of technology was 
inherently incompatible with the ancient accounts of justice and the Good: "Nietzsche's 
writings may be singled out as a Rubicon, because more than a hundred years ago he laid 
down with incomparable lucidity that which is now publicly open: what is given about 
the whole in technological science cannot be thought together with what is given us 
concerning justice and truth, reverence and beauty, from our tradition."38 In the older 
account there is an order "we do not measure and define, but by which we are measured 
and defined."39 The standpoint of technology necessarily must elide this order: the very 
possibility of a self-active will requires a break from the given order. The very being of 
technology, of modernity, of a self-contained secularity can only be ontologically 
established by a negating or occluding of the order of what is. For Grant the very nihilism 
that is manifested in pure technological willing brings to light the negativity present in 
the very being of technology. 
    A crucial implication of the ontological character of technology is that it cannot be 
itself mastered or taken-in hand or subordinated to higher human ends. All such efforts to 
get control of technology are themselves technological, not only in the obvious sense that 
one cannot master mastery, but in the more deep-seated sense that for the contemporary 
person the viable forms of moral and political thought that are supposed to give direction 
and purpose to technology, are themselves implicated in technological modernity: "The 
result of this is that when we are deliberating in any practical situation our judgement acts 
rather like a mirror, which throws back the very metaphysics of the technology which we 
are supposed to be deliberating about in detail."40 For Grant, the only possibility for 
getting "beyond" technology is, on the one hand, through the recollection of a pre-
technological ethic evoked by those remnants of pre-modernity still present, this is 
Grant's conservatism, and, on the other hand, by the self-destruction of technological 
civilization as it collapses under its own nihilism, this is Grant's radicalism. What is 
crucial in this prognosis is that Grant's account of technology allows no mediation of 
technology and a humanly livable order. As ontological, technology is corruptive of all 
efforts to humanize it by relating it to human ends. Technology must rather be allowed to 
fulfill its self-dissolution, purging the western tradition of all voluntarism and opening us 
to a participatory and receptive relation to the divine.  
    For James Doull, Grant is right in characterizing technology as ontological - but only 
in a relative and conditional sense. Doull argues that technology in the ontological sense 
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is not to be seen as modern or pre-modern in its origins though he would certainly 
concede it is not possible without the whole development of modernity. Rather, Doull 
argues that "technology" in the sense Grant intends is a nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
phenomenon. According to Doull technology arises out of the corruption and later 
collapse of the nineteenth-century nation state. He argues that technology is in fact one 
aspect of a two-sided corruption of the nation state: the other side Doull speaks of as 
nationalism, existentialism or fascism. Doull contends that technology is in truth an 
element of the nation state, but an element that takes itself to be self-complete and 
immediately actual. The other element suffers the same immediacy. In the nineteenth-
century these two elements had their radical and revolutionary theorists: the most 
developed of whom were Marx and Nietzsche. Doull suggests the twentieth-century is 
where these elements take on a life of their own as the European nation state is destroyed 
in the trenches of the First World War. The history of twentieth-century Europe is a 
gradual development from the two elements assuming themselves to be self-constituted 
wholes in the forms of communism and fascism to the dissolution of this assumption to 
the point of the present European Union in which the two sides remain as irresolvable but 
restrained aspects of European life. 
    What is crucial to grasp in Doull's analysis of technology is that he places technology 
in a comprehensive context in which it can be seen not as the whole reality but as one 
element of a more comprehensive dialectic. There is alongside technology, to which it is 
necessarily related, the existential or nationalist aspect which, for lack of a better term, 
we will call the "communitarian" aspect. The communitarian side of the contemporary, 
like the technological, takes on a variety of forms. Some of the anti-technological 
positions are religious and traditionalist, others more radical and revolutionary. However, 
according to Doull they share a common logical and structural character informed 
through the relation to technology: to preserve a realm of being from the technological 
reduction, there is the need to uncover a principle whose being is beyond the 
technological. From Doull's perspective, then, Grant himself takes up just such an anti-
technological account and so occupies a one-sided aspect of the contemporary. Grant thus 
dogmatically asserts the radical difference of technology from the standpoint that would 
recognize the Good and order of justice that informs the world. Now Doull would allow 
that this is a true perception so long as one leaves undisturbed the immediate distinction 
of the forms in which the contemporary experiences itself. But it is Doull's argument that 
this assumption is misplaced. These forms that take themselves to be directly what they 
claim to be - and this is what it is to speak of them as ontological - are in fact dialectically 
related to one another and in three senses. 
    First, according to Doull, the two sides of the contemporary are in truth historically 
derived forms arising from the nation state where, so long as the nation-state had life, 
they could be related and connected to one another. This took especially the form of the 
relation between civil society and the state, where universality and particularity were able 
to be concretely related and united. In the dissolved state of the twentieth-century there 
tends to be either the collapse of the state into civil society in communism, socialism or 
liberalism, later in a global economy, or the separation of the two in nationalism, fascism 
or Nazism and later in communitarianism. As Doull states: "In their time the thought of 
PEDDLE/ROBERTSON:  LAMENTATION AND SPECULATION: GEORGE 
GRANT, JAMES DOULL AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CANADA 
 
 109 
Marx and Nietzsche was not of general interest. Both perceived the national political 
community in a partial and unbalanced way through one of its elements. With the decline 
of the national state their thought came into its own, since the decline is nothing else than 
that elements contained before in the whole came to have rather a life of their own. The 
assumption on which the independence and completion of the national state rested was 
that life and nature were capable of containing technology - that the concreteness of the 
Christian principle existed naturally in the state. The history of these communities has 
been rather the disintegration of these elements."41  
    Doull maintains that what each side of the contemporary takes as immediate, the free 
individuals of the technological society or the rooted individuals of the particular 
community, are, in truth, historical results which do not know themselves as such. 
Indeed, according to Doull, not only are the two sides results of the whole development 
of the nation state, but the very immediacy that hides this history is itself an historical 
result. On his view, it belongs to the inadequately self-conscious or free character of the 
nineteenth-century nation state that it should so readily collapse at the point that it is fully 
developed into opposed forms. 
    There is a second sense in which there is an undisclosed dialectic at work in the 
relation of technology to community. Doull's claim is not only that the two sides share a 
common origin, but, that even in their claim to be self-grounded, they are in fact defined 
negatively through one another. The technological defines its activity relative to an anti-
technological standpoint that resists the freedom of technological universality by holding, 
for "superstitious" reasons, to a particularity that can only be understood as oppressive 
and limiting. Equally the communitarian standpoint is drawn to a principle that is defined 
precisely in its being beyond the technological - whether this be Heideggerian Being, 
Straussian nature or Gilsonian God. Further, the immediacy of the one side is precisely 
necessary to the self-grounding of the other side. Now in each case, the immediacy of the 
opposed standpoint turns out to be false: a false particularity or a false universality. For 
the technological will, the attachment to the particular is simply a negation of the 
universal and the attachment to what is in truth nothing. For the communitarian, the 
attachment to technology is a nihilism premised on negating rootedness and so is, in 
truth, the attachment to nothing. So long as these forms - the technological and the 
communitarian - stay in their distinction from one another they can at best - such as in the 
European Union - be alternately balanced, but not in truth related or reconciled. 
    This leads to the third form of dialectic that Doull points to: that precisely because of 
the two earlier forms of dialectic, there is both the possibility and need to move beyond 
the contemporary opposition of the sides of technology and community, to an actual 
relating and uniting of the two sides. Not technology simply, but the relation of 
technology to community through the institutional order of the state, Doull took to be the 
question before the contemporary era: "The practical interest of the present age is 
transparently that science and technology be brought under universal will, and that 
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individuals have their particular freedom explicitly and primarily therein - not through the 
blind conflict of aggressive wills."42 By contrast with Grant, Doull contends that 
technology can and must be subordinated to human ends. He states: "In antiquity 
Prometheus could be subdued and taught to live under the power of Zeus. But now he has 
captured the citadel of Zeus and founded technology on the sovereign right of the 
individual. The principle of the modern age is the unity of theoretical and practical. A 
more dangerous principle there could not be. But Hegel would, as before, see no other 
course than to awaken in men a clearer knowledge of this principle. Danger he would see 
to lie exactly in a seeming modesty which left open to human passions and false 
certainties to seduce reason and science from their natural end of serving humanity."43  
    For Doull, the course of the twentieth-century in Europe, from the rise of fascism and 
communism where community and technology took themselves to be complete wholes 
and accrued to themselves the whole power of the state through to the unstable relation of 
global technology and community in the European Union, there has been a coming to 
clarity that the truth of both sides of the contemporary are in themselves nothing. This 
result is already known, in Doull's eyes, in postmodernity, where the instability of both 
universal and particular is known in an all-dissolving scepticism. Doull sees 
postmodernity as the philosophy proper to the European Union. Thus, the nothingness 
that each side of the contemporary took to be the truth of the other side is found to be 
their own truth. But this is to suggest a purely negative result.  
    For Doull, this negative postmodern result is one aspect of the contemporary - that it 
comes to nothing in its effort to establish itself in itself. But equally for Doull, the 
contemporary is the fullness of the whole historical development. What Doull takes to be 
at work in the period between the Hegelian nation state and a return to the fullness of the 
historical development is not simply revolt, corruption and denial. That is to say the 
return to the lost content of the European nation state is not simply a return. The old 
nation states are, in Doull's eyes, gone for good. What the collapse of the older European 
order has accomplished is the liberation from received forms that can readily lose their 
actuality as forms of spirit. The contemporary has been, according Doull, a painful 
education beyond the immediacies that the old Europeans fell prey to. Doull suggests, 
especially in his last political writings, that it belongs to North America, and its more 
directly universal and self-conscious forms of polity, to realize the returned dialectic that 
knows technology and community as aspects of one totality in a freer and more complete 
form than even the nation states that Hegel had before him.  
    But from Grant's perspective, Doull's claim can appear contradictory. On the one hand, 
Doull claims that the state - that is the Hegelian concept of the state - can comprehend the 
difference between technology and community and yet the historical realization of this in 
the nineteenth-century nation state was in fact unable to hold together these "elements" 
and suffered disintegration. Grant's argument - as of so many others - is that given the 
actually experienced division of technology and community, it is more compelling to see 
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in technology a principle destructive of community, virtue, religion and life, than to 
suppose that there can be a uniting of technology and community, freedom and virtue, 
secularity and religion. Doull insists that this is in fact the true experience of 
contemporary Europe and sees in Heidegger especially, the most powerful and profound 
articulation of this experience. But what undergirds Doull's whole account are two 
claims: 1) That even in the division of technology and community the Idea of the State is 
still effective. This is what allows Doull to articulate a threefold dialectic even in the very 
opposition of technology and community in contemporary life and; 2) That the 
nineteenth-century European state was only an immediate instantiation of the Idea. As we 
saw earlier, Doull and Grant divide over the relation of God to historical life: here is 
another form of the same argument. For Doull, what is at work in history is the Idea of 
the state, or God's presence, as comprehensive of technology and community, even in 
their contemporary opposition. Grant, by contrast, sees God as removed from history and 
denies the Idea in its Hegelian sense. From Grant's perspective the theology of the cross 
demands the renunciation of the will, so also in civilizational terms the life in community 
in accord with virtue and in relation to the Good demands the renunciation of the 
nihilistic technological will. On Grant's view, the darkness of contemporary experience, 
the obscuring of the eternal, is the most powerful testament to the falsity of all claims 
such as Doull and Hegel make that technology or modernity can be united with virtue, 
religion and community.  
    Doull throughout his career could defend his claims by referring to the Hegelian 
system, he could explicate more accurately than Grant the history of philosophy and of 
the West more generally and so display the historical reality of the Hegelian system and 
the inadequacy of accounts of that history that assumed one or another of the aspects of 
the contemporary standpoint. He could also point to the experience of the contemporary 
which seemed to undermine the Hegelian position as in fact confirming it. For while each 
side of the contemporary divide between technology and community recognized the 
divide, they could explain it only one-sidedly and in turn could not explain the ground of 
their own position or its relation to the whole history it none the less-presupposed. But, of 
course the claim to be able to rise to a standpoint, beyond the opposition of technology 
and community that can be "objective" and mediate in thought their division is precisely 
what Grant denies.44 In the last decade and half of his life, and after Grant's death, Doull 
argues that the Idea of the state is not only available to a philosophical comprehension of 
the divisions of contemporary European culture, but is in fact actual and effective in the 
societies of the New World, especially the United States and somewhat more obscurely 
Canada. During Grant's life, Doull and Grant tended to agree that the United States was a 
technological empire as much given over to one-sided contemporary corruption and 
revolution as Europe in the disintegration of the nation state. In the period after Grant's 
death, however, Doull began to see in the United States an actual integration of 
technology and community.45 Doull could, from this standpoint, point not only above 
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contemporary life to the Idea as comprehensive of what was experienced dividedly, but 
argue that this division was being actually and effectively overcome not in Europe, but in 
the New World.  
 
The State Of Canada  
    For Grant, Canada and, indeed, any sustained independence from the technological 
dynamism of the United States is impossible. The kind of hopes Doull wrote of in his 
letters to Grant are, in Grant's eyes, empty and deluded. They show a failure to come to 
grips with the nature of the age in which we live. For Doull, Canadians do not yet 
recognize their true statehood and Grant's lamentation is thus premature and arises from a 
misreading both as to what Canada is and as to the possibilities of contemporary freedom. 
Both accounts of Canada have a certain intuitive plausibility: both acknowledge the 
ambiguity of Canadian political identity, the allegiance to a state which is neither fully 
self-governing nor fully understood in its own terms. Is Canada in the last throes of an 
already lost existence or is it only now coming to be?  
    George Grant in Lament for a Nation argues that: "To be a Canadian was to build, 
along with the French, a more ordered and stable society than the liberal experiment in 
the United States."46 Canada was, for Grant, an inherently conservative society and one 
built upon a rejection of the United States and its directly humanistic individualism. 
Through its relation to Britain and France, a connection was maintained with a culture 
that preceded what Grant called "the age of progress." This meant that English and 
French Canada sought to keep alive through their political and especially their 
educational institutions their sense of what the economy was for, and the place of religion 
in society. For Grant this embodied a connection to a pre-modern culture that saw human 
life in terms of purpose and goodness and not simply in terms of humanly enacted values 
and the individualistic pursuit of them. For Grant, a relation to the Good, a sense of one's 
creatureliness and fellow-creatureliness belonged to this older European tradition to 
which Canada sought to keep its relation. 
    The decision to build a nation more stable and less given to the illusions of modernity 
than the United States was noble but born for failure. The British connection (and in 
Quebec's case, the French connection) was vital not because of its specific ethnic 
characteristic but because it was the only living connection Canadians had with this older 
European conception of society. Thus for Grant, the failing of this connection, the 
decision of Liberal politicians to weaken rather than strengthen it, was equivalent to the 
end of Canada. Grant combines here a sense of Fate and a sense of betrayal: Canada 
could not hope to sustain this connection in the face of the dynamism and massiveness of 
American modernity. Also, specific politicians and specific social groups acted, even 
underhandedly and manipulatively, to break with this British connection.47 For Grant 
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these two moments of fate and betrayal came together in the defeat of John Diefenbaker 
in 1963: the slick and ambitious in Canada's metropolitan centres turned against him, 
used his personal follies and weaknesses to ridicule his great and specifically Canadian 
virtue of loyalty, the attachment to the given, to one's own. When Canadians turned their 
backs on their own, their loyalty to the connection to an older European sense of stability, 
they gave up, except in name, all that distinguished them from the United States.48  
    But while Grant blamed various politicians and social groups for what he took to be 
Canada's demise, as he himself put it: "The confused strivings of politicians, 
businessmen, and civil servants cannot alone account for Canada's collapse. This stems 
from the very character of the modern era."49 In Lament for a Nation, Grant emphasized 
the fate that encompassed Canada in seeking to be a nation apart from the United States 
in the age of progress. But it would be later, with his encountering the thought of 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, that Grant would come to purge his standpoint of a residual 
accidental quality - that if only Canadians and their ruling classes had acted differently, 
Canada's independence could have been retained. With the account of technology as an 
ontology, as the metaphysics of the age, the contradiction of Canada's being both a 
modern state and yet seeking to stand apart from technological absorption in the United 
States, is evident. 
    For Grant the failure of Canada, then, is not merely the failure of a small cultural 
experiment, but is the very vanishing of a relation to older, more sustaining forms: "The 
impossibility of conservatism in our age is the impossibility of Canada. As Canadians we 
attempted a ridiculous task in trying to build a conservative nation in the age of progress, 
on a continent we share with the most dynamic nation on earth."50 For Grant we can 
speak of the state in two senses: On the one hand as the institutional life of a community 
that participates so far as it is able in the order of justice and makes justice, constraint, 
and a sense of public good primary. Grant describes Canada's conservative nationalism 
and difference from the United States in these terms. On the other hand, we can speak of 
the state as a set of institutions that serve as instruments toward the realization of a 
technological will. It cannot be both or, rather, it can be both only in the sense that over a 
long period there is a transition from the one to the other in which residual elements of 
virtue and constraint both mask the true character of technology and slowly give way to 
its inexorable unfolding.51 The technological state where, as Grant states, "no appeal to 
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human good, now or in the future, must be allowed to limit [individuals'] freedom to 
make the world as they choose"52 is clearly incompatible with the desire of Canada's 
founders to "build a society in which the right of the common good restrains the freedom 
of the individual."53 Canada was caught between attachment to older forms through the 
British and French traditions received from Europe and participation in modernity both in 
terms of the overwhelming presence of the United States, but also the inherent corruption 
of the British and French traditions in so far as they were already modern. What Grant 
denied, by contrast with Doull, was that tradition and modernity, community and 
technology could be actually united. This impossibility meant that, in Grant's eyes, 
Canada was a contradiction waiting to unravel.  
    According to Doull, however, Canada is not established in its difference from the 
United States by an attachment to a conservative tradition. Doull doesn't deny that such a 
conservatism and attachment has been part of Canada's history and was vital to Canadian 
founders, both English and French. However, Doull argues that such a form of difference 
is passive and indefinite, making Canada's independence rest upon the external - and as it 
turned out unstable - realities of the British Empire and the Tridentine Catholic Church. 
Doull sees such forms of self-definition as Canadians used in the period before the quiet 
revolutions of Quebec and English Canada as "colonial". He agreed with Grant that this 
revolution destroyed the older forms of Canadian self-definition but he thought that this 
was a positive development. Doull argues that Canada's independence from the United 
States rests not upon certain qualitative measures, traditional or technological, but upon a 
substantial difference. He agrees with Grant that Canada is distinguished from the United 
States in its history and through its relation to a form of state that would order and 
restrain the passions and interests released under the American constitution but, on his 
view, this is not what fundamentally distinguishes Canada from the United States. 
    For Doull, what distinguishes Canada from the United States in the qualitative sense 
that Grant points to, that Canada is more stable and orderly, more given to the common 
good, is only a borrowed or received identity, simply British and French hand-me-downs. 
As Doull once put it: "The mere continuance of the old and customary has no power to 
educate, but can only impart an external order to the savagery of the natural will."54 Thus 
for Doull, the demand for Canada is that it come to define itself not principally through 
either Europe or the United States, though these are undoubtedly elements of Canada's 
self-definition, but through itself and so bring these elements, and others, into a concrete 
relation.  
    On Doull's account, Canada is not a confusion or mixture of technology and tradition, 
but rather a certain form of the unity of the two. Clearly, in making such a claim Doull is 
assuming the reality of the Hegelian account of the state. On Doull's view Canada is in 
principle beyond the corruption of Europe that we considered in the section above. For 
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Doull, the Europe Union is just such a mixture and confusion of technology and tradition 
- though he argues that it is tending to move beyond this in postmodernism. Nonetheless, 
his belief throughout his intellectual career was that Canada need not be consigned to 
such a condition. What especially distinguishes his political thought in the last decade 
and a half of his life is a clarification of his grounds for upholding his confidence in 
Canada as a sovereign state. Central to this clarification was a reevaluation of the United 
States.  
    For a long time Doull shared Grant's view that the United States was a technological 
empire. In the 1960s, 70s and much of the 80s, Doull saw in the United States a 
technological naturalism liberated from the rationality and constraint of its older 
Enlightenment constitution: "In place of the older order one had come to assume in the 
later nineteenth century a naturalism and against it an abstract moralistic idealism. Marx 
and the socialists would draw these elements into one view: the free natural individuality 
they proposed combined these elements. Such in general is the technological culture of 
the present time, in the United States, where it occurs in its purest and simplest form, it is 
commonly assumed that technology and a free naturalistic individuality can sustain each 
other."55 Certainly the New Deal and the emergence of the welfare state together with the 
rise of consumerism in America lead Doull, as well as Grant, to see in the United States 
the most complete embodiment of technology. So long as Doull held to this view, his 
account of Canada, as at least implicitly beyond the division of technology and tradition 
was hard to justify: why should Canada escape the corruption and revolution besetting 
the rest of the Western world? Grant's assessment that what remained of Canada's sense 
of its difference from the U.S. as resting on a residual traditionalism was at least as 
plausible.  
    By the late 1980s, however, Doull broke with this account of the United States, and in 
doing so , reconfigured his account of Canada and of the possibilities of the 
contemporary period. In a lecture Doull gave in 1992, he contrasted this new account 
with Grant's position in Lament for a Nation: "Some years ago George Grant in a well-
known book lamented the demise of Canada; a Canadian nation, betrayed by politicians, 
had fallen prey to the great technological empire to the south. But in truth neither was 
Canada a nation nor…is the United States rightly defined as a centre of 'global 
technology.' What then were we to lament? George Grant grew up in the ruins of 
Victorian culture in Ontario and Heidegger was for him a principal interpreter of the 
culture which took its place. Amicus plato, sed magis amica veritas. The effect on 
Canadians of this twofold relation to the Old World has been to make possible the 
question, what are we as a North American people, whose freedom and its political 
articulation has a different basis than for Europeans."56  
    Doull's reconsideration of the United States and re-grounding of his hopes for Canada 
lay in his recognition of what he came to call "North American freedom." This freedom 
belongs to and defines the character of the "post-national," federal states of North 
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America. It is necessary to the understanding of his fully developed account of Canada 
and its contrast to Grant's to see more clearly his conception of North American freedom. 
Doull's claim is that while Canada and the United States are each species of the genus 
North American freedom, and so provide different articulations of this freedom, because 
Canada remains immature and underdeveloped in its articulation, it is best to turn to the 
United States to capture the character of this freedom.  
    Doull defines the nation state as an uneasy symbiosis of the Enlightenment sense of 
universal freedom and equality with an adherence to the particularities of the language, 
culture and history of a given state: England, France, etc. On his view the United States, 
then, is not a nation state, as such: "The United States is the first post-national state, the 
first state based not on national particularity but on rational principles, whose history is 
essentially the development of those principles. Americans were from the first conscious 
that they attempted something new, and of consequence for the human race: there began 
with their independence a novus ordo saeclorum.57  
    Thus for Doull: "The American Union is not derivative from particular communities in 
the manner of the European Union, but is directly the common state of all Americans."58 
It is this rational or universal origin that secures, in principle, the inviolability of the 
Union. Doull states: "The Union as the common state of all Americans and that which 
defined their relations with other states, had a priority over the particular states. As the 
States were not prior to the Union, once founded, so were they not subordinate but shared 
a coincident sovereignty distinguished by the powers appropriated to each."59 On Doull's 
account, the constitution as the historical and philosophical foundation of the political 
and social institutions of the American people is thus a presupposition of the rights of 
individuals in the world, the concrete reality of their lived freedom. Thus he will argue: 
"The Union is the ultimate support of 'government of the people, by the people and for 
the people'. Political power derives from the people who made and can amend their 
institutions. But the constitution on which the self-government of free individuals 
depends, so far as it expresses and gives objective form to their freedom, is in a proper 
consideration only amendable in its essentials if the amendment is thought to be more 
adequate to that freedom. The individuals who constitute for themselves a state are 
'created equal' and have rights in virtue of that equality, among others, to 'life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness'. Government exists to support and make room for these 
'inalienable rights' and has thus a corresponding stability in its primary structure not 
subject to arbitrary amendment."(60  
    In the case of the United States civil war was required to cement the sense of the 
precedence of the Union to the rights of states. For Doull there is an immanent logic afoot 
in this development. He states: "The war between these immovable forces made evident 
what lay in the doctrine that there was not right of secession from the Union as directly 
the state of all Americans. In that relation the society of free individuals had the objective 
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constitutional structure in which democratic government - government of the people by 
their own agency and for the common well-being and the reality of their freedom - was 
possible. Through the primary concurrence of individual freedom with the operation of 
the federal state the Union was indivisible. Individuals might again find themselves 
unfree in the free society, but from that time with the sense of themselves as one nation - 
not as an association only of sovereign communities."(61  
    In short, for Doull the Union was not, in the first place, based on a contract of atomic 
individuals, rather it was founded by individuals already involved in civil society, already 
educated to political life in their particular states. In the second place, the secessionist 
movement, concretely the slave states, could not uphold the principle of freedom which 
animated the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution itself. The Union was the 
only actual historical institution, among the meaningful options, which could continue the 
principles of the U.S. constitution; its dissolution by the actions of the slave states would 
be irrational, against the current of western history, and a destruction of the very freedom 
it would seek to defend. In the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln gives voice to this 
standpoint. Describing the United States as a "nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated 
to the proposition that all men are created equal", he conceives the Civil War as "testing 
whether that nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure".62 Doull 
thus conceives the Civil War as the complete ratification of the U.S. constitution, as the 
point at which: "the loyalties of individuals to the whole and to a sovereign part coincide 
and are articulated according to the division of powers."63  
    For Doull, then, the United States is to be differentiated from the European nation 
states because founded explicitly on rational principles and not suffering in itself a 
division between the Enlightenment principles of universal freedom and equality and 
attachment to a particular culture and language. As a result, whereas the European nation 
states suffered in World War Two the virtual destruction of independent sovereignty and 
required a European Union to secure political life in the global technological economy, 
the United States is in principle beyond the nation state and not subject to its history. The 
United States is for Doull, in his most recent political thought, the clearest instantiation of 
North American freedom; a freedom that retains the concreteness that Hegel saw to 
belong to the nineteenth-century nation state, but now realized in a more adequately 
universal and self-conscious form. This freedom can hold together as one reality what 
contemporary Europe assumes only in a divided form: technology and tradition, the 
particularity of community and the universality of rights and liberties.  
    It is this North American freedom that Doull suggests Grant does not sufficiently 
recognize. From Doull's perspective, Grant is still thinking in a European context when 
he puts on one side the "nation" of British North America and on the other side the 
technological "empire" of the United States. Put in these terms, Doull would certainly 
allow that Grant's analysis is correct. Canada has experienced the dissolution of British 
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North America - and equally of French Catholic Quebec. But Doull's argument is that 
these terms are insufficient to the reality of Canada as a form of North American 
freedom. To get hold of Doull's argument it is not enough to say that North American 
states, in contrast to the European nation states escaped the direct destruction of 
institutions and culture wrought by the World Wars - this is largely true of Great Britain 
also - especially if one finds, as Doull does, the imperial expansion of nineteenth-century 
Europe to be a corruption and not an essential aspect of those states. But, Britain, as 
much as the other nations of the European Union, has found itself incapable of holding 
together technology and tradition. What is distinctive about North American forms is that 
they are post-nation states and, as such, are not technological empires that dissolve and 
destroy particularity and tradition. Rather, the federal structure of these states, their 
capacity to promote and uphold local differences, that are not at the same time simply 
frozen into external givenness of pure custom, points to a concreteness, a holding 
together of technology and community, that is beyond and yet comprehensive of the 
divideness that contemporary Europe experiences.  
    This distinctive character of North American freedom is crucial to understand Doull's 
critique of Grant's account of Canada. Grant sees Canada's distinctiveness to lie in its 
determination to conserve the presence of English and French culture in Canada and so to 
have access to a tradition of contemplation, virtue and political stability. The role of 
Canada is to act as a means to defend the institutions and ways of being that sustain these 
cultures. These cultures are received by Canadians who then participate in them and, as 
Grant understands the heart of these cultures to be a participation in the Good, there is a 
coherence here. Doull disagrees with Grant, not only as to the content of these cultures, 
but also as to the Canadian relation to them. Doull outlines a history of Canada whose 
purpose is to question the claim that English and French Canadian culture was ever 
simply participatory and conservative. Rather Doull wants to argue that from its 
beginning Canadians appropriated and transformed their received cultural forms in the 
new context of North America.  
    An implication of the more self-active account of Canadian history sketched by Doull 
is the claim that Canada's history cannot be understood as the histories of two distinct 
"nations" - British and French - that out of a shared determination to avoid assimilation 
into the United States have formed a marriage of convenience. As Doull puts this, "were 
the history of the 'two nations' such as nationalists recount, they would already have 
separated painlessly enough, seeing mutual benefit and little loss in their separation."64 
Doull's criticism of Grant is that he in fact leaves Canada as just such a compact, without 
real unity. However, Grant argues that what unites Canadians, whether French or English, 
is an attachment to the universality of the pre-modern tradition that is instantiated in 
differing forms in Quebec and in English Canada - a shared standpoint deeper than the 
differences of culture and equally opposed to American modernity. Doull, in one sense 
doesn't disagree with this, but says that if it is this universal culture that is the truth of 
Canada, then the national forms become secondary and this is what the history of Canada 
has been.  
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    For Doull, then: "There is not only a separate history of Quebec and another of a 
British 'nation'; there is also a common Canadian history more basic than either of these 
abstractions."65 In a brief discussion of the history of Canada, Doull explores both the 
way in which French and English Canada were already beyond the European culture they 
brought with them in their free appropriation of it and as such were open to and involved 
in a history shared and informed by the difference of the two peoples. So, for instance, by 
contrast with Grant's portrayal, Doull finds in the French people from the beginning that 
which is beyond a merely ancient virtue. Doull portrays the French as both subordinating 
the individual to monarch and religion but in the context of an emergent Cartesian sense 
of freedom. In North America., he argues, the feudal forms of land tenure tended to be 
merely formal arrangements.  
    Further the relation to the Monarch for North Americans was less direct than it was for 
the citizens of France, mediated as it was by the representatives of the French king. Thus 
Doull states: "In New France the will of the monarch is executed by the divided authority 
of the military Governor and the Intendant. But the relation of the country people to this 
system is different almost from the first in New France. There is not a half-servile 
peasantry, but the 'habitant' with a strengthened sense of his independence and 
equality."66  
    Doull thus concludes with a radical claim about the basis of English and French unity 
in eighteenth century Canada:  "The disappearance of the old order can appear in a 
nationalist perspective as an immense shock from which to this day French Quebecers 
have hardly recovered. It is also said that they were already a 'people' or a 'nation', in 
which case they would have in themselves a political order to replace that from which 
they were severed. It would be better said that the Conquest stabilized their relation to the 
culture earlier imposed from above, that French culture from that point took root in North 
America and was capable of an intrinsic development. The conquered were not in a later 
nationalist sense a 'nation' or 'people', but the bearers of French culture of the 'old regime', 
towards which they must find a freer relation."  
    Yet in the face of the intentions of the Durham report (1838) and the Act of Union 
(1840) it remains to be asked why, in light of such a common spirit, the French were not 
assimilated to English Canada. Doull's central point here is that the nature of 
Enlightenment principles of government in their North American context did not require 
assimilation. Within England an assumed unity of culture and language was present, and 
thus opposed to other nations who likewise assumed their own culture and language. 
They could find themselves at odds with these nations on nationalistic grounds but not in 
terms of universal principles of rights and freedoms. In Canada, however, there was not 
the division of one nation state over and against another but neither was there an assumed 
unity. In the context of the Enlightenment toleration of religion, language and civil law 
these differences among French and English were not impediments to a common state. 
Thus while the British might want assimilation in this new context they were not 
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prepared to coerce it. Assimilation might be assumed but it could not be enforced in a 
way consistent with the freedom of individuals who shared a common European heritage.  
    As a result the British found themselves moving in opposed directions. While they 
desired assimilation, The Quebec Act of 1774 recognized the right of the French 
community to its religion and law. The Constitutional Act of 1791 granted to English and 
French equally the beginnings of representative government. Likewise, Lord Durhams 
recommendations of responsible government made co-existence and not assimilation 
irreversible. The Act of Union 1840, according to Doull, actually made the sense of the 
differences among the two communities more visible.67  
    The BNA act was inadequate to the subsequent dialectic of Canadian political life and 
thus was modified in spirit and practice by the developing notion of provincial rights. In 
this way Canada begins its own home grown constitutional development. But still within 
the rubric of a presupposed unity of political ends within the Commonwealth or the 
Roman Catholic Church, for English and French Canada respectively. 
    For Doull the participation in the Great Wars drew Canada directly into an experience 
of the breakdown of the nation state. But the experience of the Second World War in 
Europe and in North America is substantively distinct and in ways beyond the obvious 
geographical realities of the conflict. According to Doull, in the wake of the First World 
War there arose in individuals a sense of the destructive quality of imperialism and the 
search for nationalist glory. Individuals thus enlightened as to the evils of the nation state 
retreat from allegiance to the modern conception of political institutions and find 
themselves able to be inspired by only one side of what the modern nation state was able 
to hold together, that is, either intuitive attachment to one's fatherland or rationalistic 
adherence to technological control. Thus the First World War on Doull's account 
dissolves the unity of reason and nature that had been accomplished in the nation state. 
But the nation still remained though now upholding primarily only one aspect of what 
had previously been held together in a mediated whole. The Second World War on 
Doull's account makes the destructive quality of both nationalized technocracy and 
nationalized naturalism evident to the former European nation states. What has occurred 
is an historical demonstration of the impossibility of holding together technology and 
nature in the nation state and likewise the impossibility of clinging variously to one side 
or the other of this dichotomy within a single nation. The independence of the nation state 
is thus dissolved and sovereignty can be maintained only through a union whose intention 
it is to retain the specifics of culture while protecting individual freedom and drawing 
member states into the global economy.68  
    Canada in its own way experienced the corruption of the modern nation state but 
because it was not structured in terms of the precise division of rights and culture 
characteristic of Europe it did not experience the twentieth century as a corruption of its 
sovereignty. Rather for Doull the experience of the Great Wars deepened the relationship 
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of Canadians to their own state and on the basis of this more unqualified allegiance made 
possible a strengthening of citizen's attachments to their own localized culture and 
provincial sovereignty. 
    In this context emerged the Quiet Revolution. While for Grant, this event in Quebec 
corresponded to and shared something of the collapse of loyalty to the British connection, 
Doull argues that these parallel developments must be seen not only in the negative light 
with which Grant portrays them, but also positively as a shift in Canada generally as to 
the ends of government and the rights and reasonable expectations of individuals in 
relation to the state. A network of social programs was established which are an 
important element in Canadians' allegiance to their common government. Doull states: 
"In Quebec the revolution began at a different point than in the other Canada, out of the 
aversion of a church-oriented society to the seductions of a modern industrial economy." 
However, on his view: "The result was generally the same in both cases, if one allows for 
cultural differences in the attitude of individuals to government."69  
    But, according to Doull, the strengthened sovereignty which emerges in Canada in the 
twentieth century, which we might see to give credence to Prime Minister Laurier's claim 
that the twentieth century will be the Canadian century, has yet to be fully appropriated 
by the public political culture of Canada. On his view, for example, the inadequacy of our 
self-consciousness and the borrowed self-image of Europe soon fragmented the Quiet 
Revolution into the opposed moments of Quebec nationalism represented by Levesque 
and French Power, represented in Trudeau's centralist federalism. But this opposition 
which the constitutional challenge present by Quebec brings to the fore for all Canadians 
is not true to Canadian history or constitutional forms but rather is borrowed. In this 
opposition, according to Doull, Canada still remains within a "post-colonial colonialism" 
- articulating its constitutional difficulties through the logic of the European Union, 
Europe in its collapse into opposed form of technology and community. From this 
standpoint, nationalists argue that the true sovereignty of Quebec can only be expressed 
in relation to Canada if Confederation is replaced by sovereignty association on the 
European model. However, such a position fails to realize that the nations which take part 
in the European Union do so on the basis of a loss of nationhood, that the European 
Union involves a surrender of important elements of sovereignty to the larger association. 
To conceive the relation of Quebec to Canada on the basis of the European Union, as do 
separatists, is thus to lose the very sovereignty they wish to assert. For Doull a properly 
Canadian account of these matters will, in truth, allow a deeper maintenance of 
sovereignty than is available on the sovereigntist account.  
    Thus Doull states in dramatic form: "The conclusion that separation is the only course 
remaining rests on personal feeling and a misreading of certain events. It has no general 
cogency. The well-founded conclusion from recent Canadian history is rather, as 
indicated, that the reconciliation of the two peoples, implied and demanded in patriation, 
is to be found neither in nationalism nor in economic individualism, as conceived in the 
European model. There is not only a separate history of Quebec and another of a British 
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'nation'; there is also a common Canadian history more basic than either of these 
abstractions."70 Here Doull's position poses a serious question to Grant's account. While 
upholding an Hegelian conception of history and of the state as an institutional 
comprehension of both an ancient and modern ethic, he does not resolve the question of 
sovereignty into the domineering subjectivity and will of the technocratic consumer. 
There is that in our history which can be shown as the rational basis of an institutional 
life which can draw the individual into a common good.  
    But for Grant, the cultural particularity of the nation state is essential to the possibility 
of retaining a relation to the older European tradition, as he puts it, we must begin with 
what is our "own" in order to rise to the Good. And Grant's history of Canada is, of 
course, quite different from that of Doull. Grant's history was of two peoples joined by 
mutual antagonism to the United States and mutual respect for a pre-modern European 
tradition, two peoples joined by shared but also distinctive loyalties. This history was for 
Grant a mixed affair. Partially it was a history of positive accomplishment that was part 
of the work of preserving Canada from absorption by the United States: here Grant 
speaks of the national projects of the railways, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 
distinctive economic and foreign policies. Grant admired as well the articulateness of 
various French nationalists, especially those who sought to preserve the Catholic culture 
of Quebec - though he also admired separatists and Quebec nationalists of his own time 
so far as they still retained a sense of what a nation is. Partially also, Grant saw in 
Canadian history a series of misunderstandings and ineptitude in the relations of English 
to French Canada: Grant saw this as a case of confusing what was important, the larger 
culture of premodernity, with what was secondary, the particular and differing forms of 
English and French Canada. So Grant lamented stupidities, such as the conscription 
crisis, by which English Canada alienated and did harm to French Canada out of a sense 
of loyalty to what was specifically English. Along these lines Grant also bemoaned, in 
Lament for a Nation, Diefenbaker's self-destructive relation to Quebec. But for Grant's 
history of Canada, deeper than both the various triumphs of Canadian nationalism and the 
missteps between the two founding peoples, was the irresistible modernizing and 
technologizing of Canada. The Canadian tradition as received from both Britain and 
France was already a mixed legacy, a confusion of the modern and the pre-modern, the 
presence of the United States made the outcome of this confusion inevitable. So what for 
Doull is the period in which Canada begins to come into its own as a sovereign state, the 
last-half of the twentieth-century, is for Grant exactly when Canada relinquishes its 
independence. And so we return to Grant's lamentation and Doull's speculative hope.  
    For both Doull and Grant, contemporary Canadians live in ambiguous times: we are 
either a state unable to articulate the sovereignty we in fact possesses (Doull) or we are 
people without sovereignty and independence and yet still think ourselves a state (Grant). 
For both there is a problem of articulation or recognition. For both what is required for an 
articulation adequate to our situation is not only a recollection of the whole history of 
Canada, nor only an understanding of its constitutional order, but also a reflection on the 
character of the contemporary as a whole - on the nature of technology and its relation to 
                                                
70 Doull, "The Philosophical Basis". 
PEDDLE/ROBERTSON:  LAMENTATION AND SPECULATION: GEORGE 
GRANT, JAMES DOULL AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CANADA 
 
 123 
the sovereignty of political institutions in this era. This latter reflection, in turn, requires a 
consideration of how higher ends and human freedom and self-activity relate: how God 
can be present or absent in historical life. It is a testimony to the depth of both thinkers 
that they are opposed to one another consistently and at the same points. To put the 
matter in its simplest form, Grant argues that there is a fundamental divide at each level, 
Doull acknowledges this division at every point but argues that it is overcome. Beyond 
the division of the British/French connection and American technology, Doull argues for 
the possibility of a sovereign, post-national Canada. Beyond the division of community 
and technology, of tradition and modernity, Doull argues for the possibility of a 
sovereignty in the state capable of uniting these aspects. Beyond the division of God and 
human historical life, Doull argues for the possibility of their effective and scrutable 
unity. Grant denies such possibilities on the basis of both an experience of their total 
division and a philosophical analysis that argues for the irreconcilability of these 
divisions. Doull, in his turn, allows that short of the absolute standpoint of the Hegelian 
philosophy, there can be no known overcoming of these opposed aspects. There is in the 
revolution of recent times a negativity which dissolves the givenness of received 
traditions and in this there is lost a world and its vision of the good, the true and the 
beautiful.  There is, however, in the freedom from that which is past, a new world whose 
history requires philosophical form.  In the engagement of George Grant and James Doull 
we find a vivid dialectic of these moments.  
  
